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Renaud Dehousse
The reference to a so-called “European Constitution” rendered recourse to refer-
enda practically inevitable. Because it suggests a radical departure from the past,
the term would inevitably affect how the constitutional treaty would be ratified.
In a number of countries, the modifications of European treaties must in any case
be submitted to a popular vote. In France, the idea of a referendum advanced by a
number of personalities such as the president of the European Convention, Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing, received the approval of leaders of all political groups
consulted by the President of the Republic. Jacques Chirac underscored that it
was “logical” to consult the people on the future of European institutions. In a
period in which distrust in the political class is considerable, opposition to
popular consultation risked accusations of elitist arrogance, which no political
leader could get away with easily.
Even in those states with no tradition of referenda, such as Great Britain,
Luxembourg, or the Netherlands, the issue was judged sufficiently important to
involve the people. In the Netherlands, it was parliament that imposed a popular
vote on an initially reticent government. In all, nine countries decided to resort
to ratification by referendum. What was to follow is now known: after the first
referendum in Spain, which saw a weak participation rate – 42.3 percent of
registered voters, fewer than at the European elections of 2004 – the constitu-
tional project would undergo in only a few days two “resounding failures.” The
difference between the ‘no’ and the ‘yes’ reached almost 10 percent in France
and more than 23 percent in the Netherlands, where almost two-thirds of the
voters voted against the treaty. In the days that followed, the British govern-
ment announced its decision to “suspend” the organization of the consultation
planned…for 2006! Two weeks later, confronted by the strong progress of the
‘no’ in the polls in those countries in which referenda were envisioned, the
European Council, unable to come to unanimous conclusions, allowed each
state to freely decide the steps to be taken. Predictably, all the countries
concerned, with the exception of Luxembourg, announced that they were
“abandoning” the vote.
The failure of this referendum campaign is indicative of the current state of
development of a European political system. It is a harbinger of several messages
that the Europeans must analyze.
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1. Sanction-votes…But for Whom?
Political scientists use the notion “second-order elections” to describe the specific
nature of European elections.1 Since the first European parliamentary election by
universal suffrage in 1979, European elections are atypical. While national elec-
tions are usually the occasion for a power struggle, this is not the case on the
European level: national parties and candidates do battle prompted primarily by
domestic concerns, and European questions hold only a secondary place. The vot-
ers follow suit, and usually decide in function of national considerations, with
often painful consequences for the majority in power. Like midterm elections in
the United States, European elections are the occasion for sanction votes against
unpopular governments. The phenomenon is all the more pronounced if the
government has been in power for a while. During the European elections in
2004, for example, the majorities in power in no less than 19 countries out of 25
were disavowed by their voters.
As a whole, the referenda of 2005 played out according to a similar scenario.
The decision to submit the constitutional treaty to the people, like the choice of
the moment, was often influenced by domestic political considerations. By resort-
ing to a referendum, Zapatero intended to get Spaniards’ approval for the change
of alliance he had carried out at the European level by moving closer to the
Franco-German duo. Counting on a positive vote, he deftly chose to open the
cycle of referenda in the hope that a frank and massive ‘yes’ would consolidate
his credit with his European partners. Inversely, knowing that he was faced with a
fundamentally skeptical public opinion, Tony Blair intended to dramatize the
referendum issue by organizing it as late as possible. A negative vote coming
after the green light of the other member states would naturally have the allure of
a no to Europe, Blair would have indicated in announcing his decision. In France,
it is probable that Jacques Chirac, following the precedents Francois Mitterrand
in 1992 and Georges Pompidou in 1972, saw a referendum on Europe as a good
occasion to divide the political opposition.
The results are equally consistent with the model of ‘second-order elections.’
In Spain, the government of Mr. Zapatero, still basking in the glow of his surprise
victory in March 2004, comfortably achieved success (77 percent), thanks essen-
tially to the mobilization of the voters from his party, the PSOE.2 However, both
in France and the Netherlands, governments that were breaking unpopularity
records were severely sanctioned by voters. Only the ‘yes’ victory in Luxem-
bourg, where the Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker has been in power for ten
years, can be seen as an exception to the rule. But there had been the shockwave
caused by the earthquakes of May 29 and June 2: Mr. Juncker managed to drama-
tize the vote and took risks by putting into play his mandate, which gained him
the support of 57 percent of the voters.
In France, the ‘no’ had never reached such a level in a referendum. Exit polls
indicate that a majority of the partisans of the ‘no’ declared they had voted in
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consideration of national problems more than European issues. The analysis of
the partisan composition of the voters of the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ confirm the
strength of the sanction vote. In the Maastricht referendum, a large majority of
Socialist voters approved the treaty submitted to them by Francois Mitterrand. In
2005 only 48 percent of them supported the constitutional treaty project, a slap in
the face to the direction of their party which had chosen to support the ‘yes.’ The
‘no’ was also the majority among supporters from other political groups from the
leftwing opposition, with scores ranging from 59 percent for the Greens to 91 per-
cent for the Communist Party. It attained 82 percent among partisans of the Front
National. In contrast, while in 1992 a majority of rightwing voters had marked their
hostility to the socialist government at the time by voting ‘no’ to the Maastricht
Treaty, this time the supporters of the parliamentary majority massively supported
the constitutional treaty project.3 In other words, the ‘no’ is clearly from the left:
54.5 percent of its partisans declared themselves close to the parliamentary left
or the extreme-left as opposed to 36.5 percent close to the right (of which 19.5
percent were close to the Front National).4
The sanction-vote effect is naturally favorable to populist and protest groups
which generally find support for their opposition to the government. The ‘no’ to the
constitution smelt of “anti-system,” all the more pronounced in that the elites -
political, media and intellectual - were largely favorable to the ‘yes.’ Unsurpris-
ingly, in France, the ‘no’ registered its best scores in those departments where the
Radical Left and Radical Right are best entrenched.5 On the other hand, the refer-
endum proved to be structurally destabilizing for the pro-European opposition
parties, torn between a sense of duty that pushed them to support the treaty
project and the will to express their identity by opposing the government. French
Socialists and the social democrats of the Dutch PvdA paid for this uncomfortable
situation. In both cases, party leaders who had declared themselves in favor of the
‘yes’ were disavowed by their voters.6
Finally, the political construction of Europe seems to have played a major role
only for the proponents of the ‘yes.’ In France, 50 percent of them – compared to
only 4 percent among the ‘no’ voters – declared themselves motivated by assur-
ing Europe’s position in the world, and 38 percent (as opposed to 17 percent) by
the role of their country in Europe.7 Even though the gap is less clear-cut in the
Netherlands, voters’ opinions vis-à-vis the European Union and the constitution
seem to have played a more important role in the ‘yes’ camp.8
Analyzed in this way, the results appear almost reassuring, like anything that is
familiar. Moreover the ‘no’ camp did not necessarily seek to be anti-European. In
France an important role was played by socialist leaders like Laurent Fabius, who
declared themselves in favor of a “pro-European no.” A clear majority of the
French (57 percent) who voted ‘no’ even claimed to be “favorable to the pursuit
of the European construction.”9 Two-thirds of them consider as well that a consti-
tution is essential to this process.10 With a bit of optimism, one could conclude
that the same text, presented at another moment by other governments, would
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have more of a chance of succeeding, as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing suggested
shortly after the vote.11 However, this analysis is short-sighted: the debate and the
vote revealed perceptions of Europe that could announce other troubles if they
remain without response. Even if we accept the idea that the sanction was essen-
tially national, it needs to be understood why Europe was used as a scapegoat.
2. Europe Frightens
In recent years, European integration, associated for a long time with the hope of
a better future, has become the source of worries for a growing number of citi-
zens. At the time of the French referendum, 52 percent of those questioned and
more than three-quarters of the proponents of the ‘no’ declared themselves wor-
ried by or hostile to Europe. For the past ten years, the number of people worried
regularly exceeded the number of those who declared themselves confident.12
This feeling is easily explained. In a world subject to rapid and radical muta-
tions, the feelings of insecurity tend to grow and diversify. Public authorities are
expected to ensure citizens’ security. Current insecurity feelings are due to a
number of elements. Economic and social factors encompass those uncertainties
that weigh on employment (unemployment, precariousness, new forms of work);
on retirement, threatened by the demographic evolutions; even on health systems.
Identity factors appear equally important: a number of mutations that affect
European societies challenge the points of reference which have structured social
life for a number of generations. The transformations of the working classes,
immigration, the weakening of traditional integration structures such as schools,
churches, political parties and unions, all have contributed to the creation of a
universe in which identity landmarks are more difficult to find.
In this context, anxiety, fuelled by the xenophobic discourse of certain move-
ments, naturally becomes strong. Now, Europe is perceived primarily as a big
market, in which the ambitions in the matter of security do not necessarily equal
the public’s expectations. The formation of a European space seems all the
more so threat in that this space tends to expand without precise limits. The free
circulation of persons benefits not only students but also immigrants; and the
exposure to competition, if it is certainly a source of increased wealth for some,
can also lead to corporate closures. Furthermore, Europe imposes on national
governments constraints that can reduce their abilities to act. The elimination of
border controls and the budgetary austerity imposed by the stability pact limit
states’ possibilities to assure their traditional functions as security providers,
and the EU has not really taken over from them. The dangers that can result
from this gap are evident. The impression - justified, or not - that the expecta-
tions of the population in this respect are not adequately taken into account has
clearly played a role in the “anti-system” votes that have been registered in the
past few years in a number of European countries. The European referenda
have breathed new life into them.
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The advocates of the ‘no’ were able to profit from this situation, by playing on
the fears of large segments of the population. During the French campaign, the
institutional reforms, which constituted the principal reason behind the constitu-
tional project, were completely obscured by the main theme of the campaign: the
“liberal” (free market) nature of European construction. Liberalism was per-
ceived as the quintessential threat. Rather than thinking about the articulation
between the market and social policy, the leaders of the ‘no’ deliberately sought
to oppose these two notions: “Europe will be liberal or social” declared Laurent
Fabius in an interview to the communist daily L’Humanité.13 The message was
heard. The dissatisfaction with the economic and social situation appears largely
at the top of the motivations of the supporters of the ‘no’ (52 percent). Forty
percent judged the constitution too favorable to the market economy.14 Identity
factors seem to have equally played a key role in the motivations of the ‘no.’
Coupled with the fears engendered by the economic situation there appeared a
feeling of “social demotion” among the less educated segments of the popula-
tion.15 The fear of the “Other” whether he be a wage-earner from the eastern
countries or a Turkish immigrant, was a powerful lever in the campaign against
the treaty. Its efficiency is beyond doubt: 67 percent of voters for whom there are
too many foreigners in France voted against the constitutional treaty, while
opposition to the membership of Turkey in the European Union constituted a
deciding factor for 35 percent of supporters of the ‘no.’16 In the Netherlands, the
question of national sovereignty and the problems linked to immigration held a
major position in the campaign.17
3. A Social Fracture
The feeling of insecurity has accentuated a social stratification of the vote that
past studies of European opinion had brought to light. In France, thanks to the
strong mobilization of popular classes, the ‘no’ acquires a large majority amongst
the working classes of the population: 79 percent of blue-collar workers, 67
percent of employees. The ‘no’ boasts a minority only amongst students (46 percent)
and retirees (44 percent). Thanks to a progression of 19 points since the vote on
the Maastricht treaty, it has become a majority amongst the middle classes (53
percent). The same observation holds for the repartition by revenue: the ‘yes’
prevails only in those households where monthly salaries exceed 3000 Euros.18
This divide can be found in other European countries: in the Netherlands, if the
‘no’ prevails in all categories, it is by 78 percent, or 16 points above average, for
blue-collar workers. Even in the rich Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, it got a clear
majority (66 percent) in the same category. There is thus a homogenous social
profile of the ‘no’ in Europe: it dominates amongst the 18–24 year olds, blue-
collar workers and those people with the lowest levels of education.19
These findings can, in part, be explained by conjunctural factors. Traditionally,
public opinion’s support for integration is sensitive to the economic situation. It
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weakens when the unemployment curve rises or in periods of slow economic
growth.20 The worse this gets, the more fears grow, fuelling in some countries a
temptation to turn in on themselves. In these conditions, how can one be surprised
that the left was seduced by the no?
But, the outline of a deeper social fracture is visible. On the one hand, social
groups of educated individuals open to multiculturalism, for whom opening up to
Europe and the world constitutes the occasion to broaden their personal and pro-
fessional horizons, and who look to the future with confidence. On the other
hand, those who see their way of life threatened by economic mutations, the rise
of precariousness, the reduction of public services, and who are confronted on a
daily basis with the presence of an imperfectly integrated immigrant population.
They have lost all confidence in traditional political parties; they are pessimistic
as to their future and that of their children.21 One of the keys to the French vote,
and the principal difference with that on the Maastricht Treaty, is due to the shift
of an important segment of the middle classes, well represented among the voters
of the Socialist Party, from the first to the second category, that of fear and thus of
the ‘no.’ If this situation were to last and to be generalized, it would endanger the
pro-European coalition, cutting across partisan cleavages, that exists in a number
of countries.
4. Appropriating Europe
On at least one point, the advocates of the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ would agree: the
intensity of the debate revealed a real will to appropriate the European issue.
France, which was accused of being apathetic and disabused by politics, wit-
nessed a campaign of an intensity rarely attained in the past. Europe, which had
long ceased to enflame the masses, became once again the subject of passionate
debates in which the participants often faced off with lengthy quotes from the
constitutional treaty. Discussion forums multiplied on the web, as well as indi-
vidual blogs, seeking to share personal readings and questions on the project.
They were often unfavorable to the constitutional project. 22
The will to master the issue was firstly intellectual: the objective was to
understand a complex text and to grasp its significance for the general evolution
of the European project. The challenge is considerable. Firstly, because the
workings of the European institutional mechanics remain misunderstood: in all
of the countries in which a referendum was organized, a lack of information fig-
ured systematically in the top causes of abstention. In the Netherlands, it was
even the first justification put forth by the supporters of the ‘no’ to explain their
choice.23 The campaign also showed that public opinion has difficulties making
sense of European integration in a context marked by the end of the Cold War,
globalization, the emergence of new international actors, the transformation of
the European economy, etc. How can a political system that is not a state, though
it possess a number of the attributes of a state, and whose territorial limits
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remain uncertain (since it seems to have a vocation to enlarge endlessly), be
understood? This “crisis of minds”24 made more than one publisher happy,
because of the explosion in the sales of books dedicated to the constitutional
project, but it is doubtful that this suffices to appease the Europeans’ thirst for
knowledge.
The campaign and the vote also revealed citizens’ clear will to influence the
political future of Europe. Polls have illustrated for a long time that the European
Union – “Brussels” – is often perceived as a distant entity, insensitive to the con-
cerns of common mortals, sometimes even arrogant. A majority of Europeans
estimate that their voice doesn’t matter much.25 The demands for a larger role
for the citizens figured in the arguments of both camps. It was natural that this
aspiration be translated into a higher participation in the vote: in France, it
attained 69.4 percent of registered voters, almost at the level of that of the Maas-
tricht referendum (69.7 percent). In the Netherlands, where in the absence of a
referendum tradition there was no precise mark, the parties of the majority indi-
cated that the government would be bound by the result only if the participation
rate exceeded 30 percent; in the end it reached 62.8 percent. In the two countries,
the proponents of ‘no’ managed to seize on the trend, and present the rejection of
the constitution as a unique opportunity for citizens to make their voices heard.
This desire to weigh on the course of events is noteworthy. Over the past few
years, a revisionist wave has developed in the analysis of European integration,
questioning the traditional readings of the “democratic deficit.”26 In a union of
states, it is said, is it not normal that political choices be legitimized above all by
the will of governments, themselves democratically legitimized by the suffrage
of their citizens? And shouldn’t the weak turnover registered in the European
elections be seen as the indication of a lack of interest in Europe? These criti-
cisms, which often are based on very thorough analyses of the European reality,
usually end up in a plea for the status quo, the current system being perceived as
best adapted to the current situation of the European construction.
The spring 2005 referenda have, however, shown that when they are called
upon on precise issues (which is not the case at the moment of European elec-
tions), European citizens give clear evidence of their will to weigh in on the
choices that are made. Both supporters and adversaries of the constitutional
treaty agreed that the weight of the citizens should be reinforced; their main dis-
agreement was on the best way to reach that goal. In sum, no one was satisfied
with the status quo. That is an important point. In the future, when the history of
this period is written, perhaps it will be seen as an important turning point. In
nation-states, the political community began to take shape the day the citizens
became worried about the consequences on the local level (the only one which
counted in the past) of the choices that were made on the national level. Perhaps
the recognition of the direct links that unite national politics and European polit-
ics, witnessed during the debates on the referendum, mark an important step in
the constitution of a European political space. In order for the latter to emerge
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completely, however, a considerable difficulty must be overcome: how can a
real transnational dialogue be organized in a union of heterogeneous states?
5. The Difficult Emergence of a European Public Sphere
The works of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas insisted on the necessity
of the construction of a transnational space for deliberation if we are to take the
idea of democracy at the European level seriously.27 One cannot in fact speak of
democratic deliberation if the participants of the debate do not pay attention to the
viewpoints that are expressed in other parts of the Union. Yet, the practical obsta-
cles are considerable. The average knowledge of other member countries remains
limited – whether it is of their history, their culture, their way of life, or their
political preferences. National media often pay only superficial attention, often to
confirm old prejudices (the British are the vassals of America, the French
obsessed with their past grandeur, the Italians unreliable…). Finally, there are no
common media and how could it be otherwise, given the absence of a common
language?
The difficulty of the question is well illustrated by the way in which the debate
on the ratification of the constitutional treaty was organized. After all, given that
the referendum involved a constitutional text conceived to direct the whole of the
European Union, it would have been logical that this debate be organized at the
European level.28 Towards the end of the European convention’s work, an
important number of its members, worried about avoiding the nationalization of
the debate, pleaded in favor of a consultation that would be held simultaneously
in all member states of the European Union. In this way, they suggested, the peo-
ples of Europe would have the opportunity to decide together how the political
system of the Union should function and to compare their viewpoints. The
national governments did not see it this way: for them, being the product of an
inter-state agreement, the constitutional project could only be approved individu-
ally by each country. A pan-European consultation could have marked a symbolic
step toward the constitution of a European political body, a result to which most
of them were hostile.
The campaigns that followed showed that the legal reading of the European
situation made by the governments reflected rather well the social reality of the
moment. The arguments remained largely national, despite the occasional inter-
ventions from political leaders of other countries, more frequent in France than
elsewhere. The leaders of the French socialist party, who drew argument from the
general support of European socialists and the European confederation of Trade
Unions for the treaty project, rapidly saw that the argument remained without
echo, when it wasn’t purely and simply returned by the ‘no’ camp on the theme:
“the French people are mature enough to decide for themselves.” The themes of
the campaign significantly varied from one country to another: the neoliberal
nature of the treaty and the fear of industrial delocalization for the French; for the
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Dutch the contribution to the community budget and the refusal to dilute national
identity in a melting pot. In themselves, these divergences are hardly surprising:
they only reflect basic differences in the situation and the preferences of each
country, moreover, this kind of territorialization of issues is far from unheard of
in countries with a unitary structure. On the other hand, the preoccupations and
the arguments involved in other countries received very little attention. How
many French heard about the reasons that pushed the Spanish to vote yes, or the
worries of the Dutch?
The debate on a social Europe, which constituted one of the highlights of the
French campaign, demonstrated how difficult it can be to take into account oth-
ers’ perceptions of reality. Many a discussion – among others about the so-called
Bolkestien directive – started from the idea that it was indispensable to protect the
French social model against any threat of dilution that could result from a “race to
the bottom” in terms of social protection, especially following enlargement. The
remedy invoked held in one slogan “A Social Europe,” that is to say, for the most
part, an alignment of the social standards of all countries on those of France. This
reading of the problem obscured nevertheless an essential aspect: even those part-
ners the most concerned with social justice would hesitate to qualify France as a
social model. When one considers the unemployment figures, the employment of
the over-55 year-olds and the solidity of the retirement system, France often lags
behind. In these conditions, countries like Denmark or Sweden would obviously
refuse to align themselves on the French model, not because they are obsessed
with a liberal logic but because they would wish to protect their own Welfare
State. If a “social Europe” sees the day, it is unlikely too take the form of a
complete harmonization. The fact that this aspect of the question did not emerge
during the campaign illustrates one of the great problems of France in European
debates: the difficulty of representing that others may have a different point of
view and its corollary the incapacity to conceive of a Europe other than as a
“Great France,” which equally surfaces in many litanies on a “l’Europe-
puissance,” i.e., the idea that the Europe show somehow acquire the status of a
real international power.
Conversely, the French debates were largely followed in the rest of Europe.
Seeing a founding state, who has not stopped playing a leading role in the Euro-
pean construction, and whose traditional views found an echo in the constitu-
tional project, thanks notably to the (French) president of the convention, rise up
against this project was enough to surprise France’s partners. Interestingly argu-
ments opposed to the text were those that echoed most abroad. Irony of history:
while the idea of a constitution was primarily conceived to encourage the devel-
opment of a common European consciousness, the project above all contributed
to assuring the diffusion of feelings that were hostile to it – an “anti-constitutional
patriotism” in some ways, diametrically opposed to that which Jürgen Habermas
imagined, but which may have contributed to the emergence of a public space
which he had hoped for.
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Whatever the case may be, one thing is clear – and it is the fifth lesson that
must be learned from the 2005 referenda: the juxtaposition of national campaigns
does not suffice to prompt a European debate.
6. Why Referenda Are Inadequate
The phase that finished with the vote in Luxemburg in June 2005 showed to what
extent the handling of an instrument like the referendum was delicate in the
framework of a Union of states.
Hypothetically, the referendum assumes that the most simple of answers – yes
or no – can be given to the question asked. Yet, this binary nature is singularly
unsuitable to the complexity of the issues. What are the ambitions of the Europe
of tomorrow? How should Europe be governed? What should the balance be
between the Union and the member states, between the different European insti-
tutions? So many sensitive questions, to which eighteen months of intense debate
only brought partial answers, such was the distance of the initial positions. And
one would want to pass on the final compromise by some sort of magic lantern
that erases all the nuances?
The referendum campaigns that this path entailed brought a series of risks.
Excessive polarization, firstly. To be sure, there was debate, which is in itself
positive, and it was even of rare intensity, with the exception of Spain. But at
what price? Half truths, truncated quotes, excessive simplification, and excessive
dramatization: the list of vices of the discussion is long. Did it have to come to
this to talk about Europe? Those, like Jacques Delors, who sought to avoid sim-
plistic sketches, rapidly noticed that there was hardly room for nuances. It is not
in this type of debate that the citizens would find answers to the question that tor-
ment them.
Second comes the risk of coalitions of opposites. Even if by magic the referen-
dum campaigns had not been “polluted” by national political considerations, the
binary nature of the question would have nonetheless united those driven by dia-
metrically opposed motivations in a negative vote. For, as the posters of French
right-wing politician Phillippe de Villiers proclaimed, with a text of 448 articles,
“we all have a reason to say no”: those who deplore the absence of a reference to
God in the constitution and those who fear the undermining of secularism; those
who criticize the weakness of social measures like those who would like to see
more considerations for corporate competitiveness. Yet again, is a convergence of
this type likely to clarify the debate? It clearly did not help to identify alternative
solutions. And how could it be otherwise? It is difficult to imagine radical left and
extreme right leaders agree on a common European project. Yet the dangerous
simplicity of the referendum permitted them to win together on May 29.
Herein lies the heart of the problem. Because it unites old states, whose prefer-
ences are often heterogonous, Europe is condemned to the pursuit of consensus.
One of the principal reasons for the success of the European construction, singular
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experience in the history of peoples, is due to an uncommon capacity to produce
compromise. The heavy EU machinery is conceived to favor the emergence of
large convergences. Each institution works toward this end in its own way: the
Commission thanks to the collegial nature of its decisions, the Council through
the use of the qualified majority voting as a weapon of last resort; and even the
Parliament, where party considerations play a larger role, knows it is essential to
identify common ground between the 129 national groups represented within if it
intends to weigh in relationships with the other European institutions.
All these compromises require patient negotiation between the representatives of
the different interests that coexist within the European polity: national interests,
sectoral interests, ideological preferences. The price of this governance by consensus
is known: an opaque system, barely legible, in which it is difficult to identify with
precision those responsible for a decision—and thus to censure them if necessary.
In these conditions the attraction of procedures destined to permit citizens to
express their voice in a more direct fashion is understandable. This injection of
participatory democracy must however not threaten the consensual essence of the
system. One should therefore avoid pseudo-simplifying mechanisms in which
heterogonous coalitions, that everything opposes, can imperil patiently negotiated
compromises even when they are incapable of proposing an alternative.
6. The Crisis of the Fischer Method
The disenchantment of the citizens with regard to Europe is often attributed to the
functionalist method followed in the past. By deliberately avoiding discussion on
the political finalities of integration and in multiplying ad hoc forms of coopera-
tion, an edifice of a great complexity was put into place on the European level, so
it is said, and the citizens are not capable of making sense of the European con-
struction. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer echoed this criticism. In his
famous speech in Berlin, given a few days after the fiftieth anniversary of the
Schuman declaration, he clearly distanced himself from what he called “the
inductive communitarization according to the Monnet method.”
This gradual process of integration, with no blueprint for the final state, was
conceived in the 1950s for the economic integration of a small group of countries.
Succesful as it was in that scenario, this approach has proved to be of only limited
use for the political integration and democratization of Europe. …Today, a crisis of
the Monnet Method can no longer be overlooked, a crisis that cannot be resolved
according to the method’s own logic.
This is why he pleaded in favor of a reflection on what the political architecture
of the Union should be at the end of the integration process.
Whatever one may think of the criticism of functionalism proposed by
Fischer,29 it is evident that his analysis had a strong impact. Widely shared at the
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time, it inspired a change of course. In 1999, under the German presidency, the
European Council entrusted an assembly composed of representatives of govern-
ments, of national parliaments and of member of the European parliament with
the drafting of a charter of fundamental rights - “to render visible that which had
been invisible”, that is to say Europe’s interest for fundamental liberties, in the
words of Fischer. After the semi-failure of Nice, the European Council at Laeken
endorsed the diagnosis of a crisis of the Monnet method. The formula of the con-
vention was thus retained to begin reflection on the “finalities of Europe”
desired by the German minister. It later gave birth to the draft constitutional
treaty. The failure of this must lead us to question the validity of the “Fischer
method.”
The experience of the convention confirmed the difficulties faced when the
agenda deals essentially with institutional questions. From the instruments that
they were, the institutions have become ends in themselves. National susceptibili-
ties awoke and the negotiation took on the attributes of a zero-sum game, render-
ing the search for an agreement more arduous. As the convention was unable to
identify the contours of a common ambition, the debates became harder as soon
as institutional questions were brought up. The artificial divide between “large”
and “small” countries, largely absent in the last decades, became a central
problem,30 which explains the rather tumultuous end of the constitutional drafting
process, with an agreement extracted in extremis despite the objections proffered
by the Spanish and Polish delegates.31
The absence of a clear political project not only complicated the task of the
negotiators, it also rendered more difficult the defense of the final compromise.
The referendum debates permitted the testing of the validity of the method recom-
mended by Fischer and the advocates of a debate on the ultimate objectives of the
integration process. With known results: throughout the various referendum cam-
paigns, the institutional questions were kept in the dark in favor of controversies
on the content of existing treaties, and a question remained without an audible
answer: what was the purpose that the proposed reforms were meant to serve?
Seen in that light, the rejection of the constitutional project is hardly surprising; it
only confirms the lessons of fifty years of integration. That lesson must be taken
into account in the future. As in the past, Europe will evolve only to reach precise
objectives, not on the basis of an abstract model of what a good European govern-
ment should look like.
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